Margin Account Definition and Example

Inflation: The Assassination of the Argentinian Peso by the Coward Central Bank

Argentina, if you know anything about its economy, is a very peculiar country. Once (or twice) a prosperous nation, now one of Latin America’s handful of embarrassing basket cases, plagued by everything from deep economic stagnation, high labor market informality, a weak currency, and chronic high inflation.
We will go through a short tour of inflation, starting from the 70’s onward, and will give some extra thought to the current situation. After that, the aim is to focus on more “theoretical” perspectives of inflation, to showcase its causes, and to focus on its consequences. Finally, a brief conclusion about Argentina will have to be reached.

¿What is inflation? (Prices don’t hurt me, don’t hurt me, no more)

Inflation is the generalized growth in the average price level of an economy. If you measured every price of every product in a country over several periods of time (generally each month), then you would be able to perfectly estimate the rate of inflation in an economy. Measuring inflation is generally important because it tends to signal how stable an economy is (an inflation rate of 80% is never a good sign) or, on the contrary, how stagnant it is (Japan has famously had issues raising its near-zero percent inflation, to the point they actually reached out to Argentine economists to learn from us how to get prices moving).
Obviously, measuring literally every price in an economy is hard (citation needed) so governments, as this is an important indicator, learnt how to make do. In Argentina, inflation is officially measured by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC by its name in Spanish) in something of a three-step process. Since this is a little complicated (their manual is 48 pages long) let’s keep it simple: the first step is measuring what people actually consume, by simply asking them and making a list. Secondly, you get in touch with various supermarket, grocery stores, and corner shops around the country (and a whole lot of other things; how the price of things like education, transportation, or home repairs is gathered is a well-kept secret). The final step is building the measurement itself: instead of presenting the “raw” price of the things, you average them up into an index, which is a number that picks a base year and assigns it a generic value of 100 (it is clearly important to actually measure whatever you are adding up), so then every subsequent measurement is expressed as a percentage change regarding the index - and with certain caveats.
The last step has one crucial complication: a 1% increase in food prices or rent is obviously more important than a similar change in newspapers, and a price control policy in a sparsely populated area would get dwarfed by runaway inflation in a major population center. To account for both effects, INDEC assigns weights to each component of its Consumer Price Index (CPI) and to each region of the country - which can lead to some wacky consequences, since just two (Buenos Aires Metro Area and the Pampeana Region) out of the six make up 80% of the CPI.
Obviously this process has many flaws, and the CPI is not the only inflation index (only the most important one), as producers and wholesalers use their own price measurements, in what is called the Wholesale Price Indices System or SIPM. The inflation estimates for the month are generally published on a Wednesday halfway through the month, and always refer to the previous month. For example, the March report (neat graphics, by the way) came out in April: monthly inflation was 3.3%, up from 2% in February, and was fueled by price hikes in Education (due to the beginning of the school year) and communications. Since a strict lockdown was mandated by the authorities, INDEC decided to clarify their measurement process, which is generally conducted by in-person inspectors: they checked supermarket websites, and reached out to stores via phone calls and emails - which may have distorted the prices, because those stores are the likeliest ones to “afford” maintaining the official prices. Most provinces measure inflation on their own anyways, with the two most respected indicators belonging to the City of Buenos Aires and San Luis.

A brief history of inflation

There isn’t a lot of available historic data on inflation in Argentina, considering the government hasn’t always been particularly forthright with it. This delightful graphic found on Reddit (and taken from a reputable consulting firm, if you were having doubts) shows that price stability hasn’t been one of Argentina’s strengths, especially since the 40’s.
To start somewhere on a really long history, let’s pick the 1975 “Rodrigazo”, where - amidst a record 15% government primary deficit - Treasury Minister Celestino Rodrigo hiked public utilities by triple digit rates, massively devalued the peso, and granted eye popping wage agreements to unions - with the consequence that the year had inflation of 350%. The economy was generally devastated, and the government had such a fragile grasp of power the President was deposed by a coup in March 24th, 1976. Inflation in the triple digits (which starts an awkward debate about hyperinflation I do not intend to have) was a constant of the late 70’s and 80’s, until a mild slowdown (to a comfortable 80% in 11985) due to the Austral Plan: a heterodox attempt to reduce inflation by a combination of price, wage, and utility controls; de-indexation of contracts, and changing the currency from the embattled peso to the brand-new Austral, with a 1.1:1 exchange rate. Problems showed up when the government started being unable to control the economy (and to pay off its substantial internal debts with means other than printing money), and as the Austral quickly depreciated more and more; from that 1.1 exchange rate, it devalued by the hundreds in good months, and the tens of thousands in bad ones. By 1989, an election year, the economy had entered a bonafide hyperinflation of 5000% as the Austral devalued by 13,000%. The government party obviously lost reelection, and Peronist successor Carlos Menem reduced inflation to 0% (quite literally, in fact) by ditching the Austral and returning to the peso, which would have a 1:1 peg to the dollar. The dollar would also become legal tender, and indexation of contracts was strictly banned. Alongside massive fiscal reforms that reduced the deficit (temporarily, at least) inflation gradually disappeared, becoming a ghost by 1994.
This currency peg survived for a decade, until a massive crash of the economy in 2001 (which is a bit too complex to get into at the moment) forced the government to get rid of the peg in 2002. The original plan was to have the exchange rate jump to 1.4 pesos per dollar, but the free market had other ideas: to gain financial stability, the peso depreciated by nearly 400% - resulting in 40% inflation for the year, the highest in nearly a decade. The situation subsided in 2003, and the economy began recovering; the new President, the left wing Nestor Kirchner, had an economic vision that rested on a trade surplus, a high exchange rate, and balanced fiscal accounts. Inflation, first in the low and then the high single digits, began showing up again by 2005; while Treasury Minister Lavagna proposed cutting back on spending growth and monetary emission, the President objected and instead resorted to price controls; Lavagna resigned a few months later.
In 2007, after Kirchner had been succeeded by his wife a row between INDEC and Commerce Secretary Guillermo Moreno started brewing - inflation figures were higher than they were supposed to be in sight of some brand new price freezes in certain sectors. Moreno wanted the statistics agency to hand over data on which companies were raising prices, which was (and still is) illegal; INDEC refused, and the government retaliated by firing most of its career staff on certain key departments (mostly inflation and employment) and replacing them with more friendly figures, which started reporting data that agreed with the government’s vision of the economy.
Inflation steadily grew (or did it…) as Cristina Kirchner’s government adopted increasingly more reckless monetary and fiscal policies and started purging its economic staff of anyone with mildly reasonable ideas, to replace them with heterodox cranks. For example, in 2010 the President attempted to fire the highly respected President of the Central Bank, Martín Redrado; he refused to resign, claiming to having been appointed by the Senate to a full term. This devolved into a 3 month legal battle, where the courts finally sided with the banker; nevertheless, he resigned, and was replaced with the Mercedes Marco del Pont, who had… unusual ideas about inflation (mostly, that it was caused by market power and oligopolies flexing their muscle). The government pegged the exchange rate again, and imposed stringent currency controls (known as “the clasp”) to prevent leakage of US dollars. These measures hurt the trade result, and weakened the peso by creating a massive black market for speculators to sell US dollars above the official rate. In this era of recklessness, which saw large deficits funded mostly by emission, inflation ratcheted up to the high tens and then the twenties annually.
After the 2015 elections, where Kirchner’s preferred successor lost to the center right Mauricio Macri, the new government lifted these restrictions and devaluated the currency under a simple assumption: prices had been set using the parallel exchange rates (and not the lower official rate), so a devaluation wouldn’t substantially increase inflation. The government also made another miscalculation: highly regressive enregy subsidies made up about two third of the 6.6% fiscal deficit they inherited, so they assumed the massive lag in them wouldn’t really increase inflation - businesses could just swallow the cost without much guidance. These two glaring miscalculations made the inflation rate jump to 40.6% anually in 2016, the highest level since the 2002 devaluation. After the exchange market calmed down in 2017, inflation decreased by 15 points and stabilized at 25% for the year, netting the government a big win in the midterm elections. In 2018, after a few international shocks and decreasing trust that the government would actually do anything about the country’s finances, the peso began rapidly devaluing again, jumping from 17 to 45 in relation to the dollar in a couple months. Inflation spiraled out of control again, jumping to 46% annually. 2019 showed a similar dynamic: the Central Bank had massively increased interest rates, to the 60’s, to prevent inflation; the dollar stabilized from January onward, and the Presidential election was expected to be close. Macri had to fight tooth and nail Peronism’s new leader, the more moderate Alberto Fernandez; while pollsters expected the August Primaries to be close, their actual result was a blowout: the incumbent lost by 16 points and only won two out of 24 provinces. The market went into panic mode: the dollar jumped by a third literally overnight, and the stock and bond markets halved in value over the course of a week. Macri ultimately shrank his margin of defeat to a respectable 8 points, and the government handoff went smoothly-ish; inflation, which was already expected to be in the 30’s to 40’s, skyrocketed in August and September and reached 54% over the year, the highest figure since the 90’s.
Fernandez showcased his pragmatism by increasing controls on the currency markets, increasing some taxes, and freezing most pensions (the largest item in government spending by far). A combination of monetary stability and trust in the new President slowed inflation to the 2 to 3 percent monthly area, until March. In that month, since the government mandated one of the earliest and strictest lockdowns in the world, a perfect storm of plunging circulation (since nobody was buying as much), exchange rate stability, and price measurement fuzziness (as explained in the 1st paragraph) let the monthly inflation rate fall even further, to the high ones - their lowest since 2018.
This isn’t really a sustainable decrease, and is mostly temporary: a combination of no circulation of money, no demand for dollars (for once, actually buying them is quite the odyssey), widespread price controls, and utility freezes have repressed inflation (i.e. kicked iit down the line), not reduced it. Its future development will result from whether or not the peso is devalued (not devaluing it would gravely hurt trade results and attack the Central Bank’s balance sheet at its Achilles heel, international reserves - which have dropped by 1 billion dollars since April), how price restrictions are lifted, and monetary policy actions to revert the massive jump in the monetary base we have seen - almost a trillion pesos have been printed since March, and it has grown by 88% compared to last April.

A simple monetary-fiscal framework of inflation

The simplest theory we’ll be summarizing is the one laid forward in Philip Cagan’s “The monetary dynamics of hyperinflation” (1956) (link here). Cagan decided to look into governments that had had hyperinflations in the past, and look at which factors had most influenced that.
The main variable Cagan wanted to look at was the demand for real cash balances (i.e., the demand for money divided by the price level); the explanatory factor he found for why it changed during hyperinflations was that the price level increased much faster than the demand for money (no doy).
The first assumption comes here: Cagan claimed that the demand for money (which was equal to supply at all times) depended mostly on inflation expectations, i.e. what people expected prices to be like in the future; this relationship was such that when inflation expectations grew, monetary demand would drop. A key factor here is that this relation (which was a log equation but this isn’t a math class) was mediated by a factor, known as alpha, which set how reactive monetary demand actually is to changes in expectations; if it’s high, then people are easily spooked, and they get rid of their money really easily.
But, exactly, how do those expectations move around? Cagan saw that, even if inflation died down for a bit, real cash balances were still low; his reaction was to assume that inflation expectations change through time as a function of prediction errors, i.e., the difference between expected and real inflation. He simply multiplied that difference by a fixed coefficient, beta, which also measures “jumpiness” - so a really high beta means that a small prediction error has big consequences on the future rate of expectations, and therefore on future monetary demand (depending on alpha, of course).
Since this is a monetary-fiscal model, let’s talk spending. Governments on the brink of hyperinflation aren’t especially good borrowers, so they barely have any access to credit (if anything, they have large debts to pay off - more on this later). Since tax collection is dodgy and inflation comes with a few problems of its own (more on this, too, later), then they have a notorious deficit that can only be sustained by seigniorage (printing money). If the monetary base grows at a constant rate, such that the deficit is always funded, then this monetary base growth entails (for weird mathy reasons) a monetary base that coincides with it, and therefore levels of “expectations” where the deficit is fully funded and monetary supply equals monetary demand. In this case, the government funds its deficit through what’s known as the inflation tax: when spending is funded directly by printing new money that “owns” real goods, then the amount of goods hasn’t changed, but the amount of money has; therefore, its “value” (as in purchasing power) should be lower to properly express this (this is a gross oversimplification, and the answer only really makes sense through boring budget constraint math).
As all other taxes, the inflation tax has a rate (inflation) that people pay and a base (money) which pays it; and since it’s a tax (and now it’s time to make the succs mad) then it can safely be assumed to have a Laffer curve: there’s a quadratic relationship between tax collection (i.e. how large a deficit can be funded) and tax rates (how high the inflation rate is); this is because, since the inflation tax is on real cash balances, then higher inflation starts shrinking them at some point, so revenue is lower.
Assuming the deficit isn’t at the peak, then you have two equilibria for any given level of spending: one at which the inflation rate is lower, and one at which the inflation rate is high. Exactly which one of them the economy ends up in (which one is stable) depends on one thing: how “jumpy” agents are. If alpha and beta are very high, then any changes to monetary and fiscal policy will ripple across the economy, so everyone will suddenly drop a lot of their real cash balances expecting them to lose their value. This will obviously mean they do lose value, and inflation rises; therefore, only the high inflation equilibrium can be stable if alpha and beta are large (this is also proven by looking at the math). And in the opposite case, where people don’t go around dropping their life savings at any inconvenience, then the low inflation equilibrium is stable. This means that, for example, reducing the deficit or slowing monetary emission can only work if alpha and beta are small, so people don’t overreact in anticipation and blow it; as a result, if they are high, then inflation will actually increase (if you look at the graph, you see that a lower deficit means a lower “good” state and a higher “bad” state).
Obviously this shows that, for the notoriously volatile Argentinian economy, maybe tight monetary policy or fiscal austerity aren’t good fits… which kinda explains the Macri failure to lower inflation.
Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace expanded this model in their 1973 paper “Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation”. Their main idea was to re-express the system not, as Cagan did, assuming rational expectations, but by instead assuming perfect foresight- i.e., that nobody could be “surprised” by inflation, because every time a deal is made both participants settle on the price after reading the Central Bank balance sheet for a while. In this case, expected inflation always equals actual inflation, so expectations never change compared to inflation because expectations are always correct.
Without much of an effort to explain any other meaningful differences, it suffices to say the model is differently specified. A counterintuitive consequence of perfect foresight is that only the high inflation steady state is stable: if starting at the “good” state, then any disturbances would create a feedback loop where the government attempting to earn more (or less) revenue by increasing (or reducing) either the inflation tax rate or the monetary base results in the public catching on and counteracting, leading to the cycle repeating itself with inflation just piling on. At the bad state, the government fully funds its deficit once again and everyone remains where they are - so no matter how much perfectly rational agents react to changes in inflation, since those changes are never unexpected and always counteracted, the inflation rate cannot go down by surprising or “tricking” them.
This doesn’t have the clearest relation to Argentina’s inflation rate, but it does illustrate how inflation can be high even when everyone is perfectly aware of what’s happening in the economy.

Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic

Sargent and Wallace made another, much more notorious contribution to the literature on inflation: their famous 1981 paper titled “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic”. Let’s imagine that the government actually does have access to debt - so it can, in fact, finance the deficit by either printing more money (which works as Cagan specified it) or by issuing debt. Assuming a single and constant interest rate (or various interest rates that remain constant nonetheless), what happens is that the Central Bank gains independence: since it doesn’t have to singlehandedly fund the government, it can also try to reduce inflation (or raise output, but we’re assuming that isn’t the main concern at the moment). This means that the government can’t choose how to fund its deficit - the actions of the Central Bank determine how much money it raises from the inflation tax, and therefore how much of the rest of the deficit must be financed through new debt. It could also be possible that the government has a very detailed fiscal plan, that determines how high the deficit would be and how much debt can be taken; the Central Bank then is “dominated” and has limited degrees of freedom around providing the required seigniorage.
Let’s dive into debt: it is very clear that countries can’t actually take infinite debt, but what’s trickier is to prove it; it can still be safe to assume that there comes a point where investors start having doubts that the government can actually pay off its debts; there’s also the fact that the public only has a limited demand for bonds (among other reasons, because people can’t just give up all their cash - grocery stores don’t accept Treasuries as payment). As a result, there comes a point where the government can’t actually issue more bonds to pay off its debt - and immediately thereafter, it has to increase printing to accommodate the entire deficit (plus interest and principal payments on debt, which will be ignored).
Let’s assume that the Central Bank wants to lower inflation using its limited independence - it decides that it will reduce the growth of the monetary base, which in either framework results in lower inflation due to lower seigniorage revenue to be “offset”. This means the government has to take more debt than usual; as a result, the tipping point for debt comes sooner. Once this happens, bond sales equal zero but the deficit is still constant, which means that there is a discrete jump in the stock of real balances to match it; as a result, the growth of the monetary base skyrockets from near zero in a very short period of time, which means that inflation actually increases as a result of the Central Bank’s policy change.
This has very clear implications: tight monetary policy can’t coexist with loose fiscal policy indefinitely. Someone tell that to Macri, because that is what he did: ignoring the devaluations and utility hikes, simply replacing seigniorage with debt (through raising the interest rate and therefore lowering the demand for money relative to bonds, which isn’t that relevant to this discussion) can’t work if the deficit remains constant - or even increases, since he also threw in some tax cuts in 2017.

Devaluations and inflation

The Macri era had three massive devaluations, all of which affected prices. Why? On the abstract, there are two reasons for this: increasing costs for sectors that require a lot of imports, and expectations (basically, people expect that a devaluation will increase inflation, so they protect themselves by… raising prices, therefore increasing inflation). The dynamics can properly be explained by looking at which assets people hold.
If you assume, in the first place, that people hold only domestic money and US dollars (or any other foreign currency), you can then divide the situation into two cases: one with a floating exchange rate (where the price of the US dollar is determined by the market) and one with a fixed rate (where it’s set by the government). This can be properly modeled with Flood & Garber (1984), where, in the floating rate scenario, agents change the composition of their asset portfolios: during a devaluation the real demand for money is reduced in favor of the demand for foreign currency, such that the price level increases since the inflationary tax has to do “extra work”, but for the same level of foreign currency, since sellers are scarcer than buyers.
Under a pegged rate, things get messy. If you look at the monetary base, it is divided between domestic credit, which is like the regular printed money from before, and international reserves (simply put, big stockpiles of US dollars the Central Bank owns). The pegged rate means that inflation via exchange rate factors disappears, so this lowers inflation (if pre existing inflation is low, then prices virtually don’t change); the problem is that it also means that to maintain the exchange rate, the Central Bank has to sell its reserves - no private agent will be incentivized to sell theirs. Clearly, sustainability becomes an issue: reserves can eventually run out, which means the Central Bank will have to devalue. At this point is where monetary expansion becomes an issue: assuming the monetary base grows at a constant rate, then decreasing reserves means that it eventually will contain only domestic credit, which is pumped into the general economy. This has an interesting implication: there exists one point at which the reserves equal an amount of money that speculators (or investors) have in their portfolios; therefore, a speculative attack may occur such that private actors buy out the Central Bank to force a devaluation.
All actors buy, under perfect foresight, at the exact same time (otherwise everyone else would have predicted someone who was “ahead” to make a big profit, so they all jump in to gain too, which means nobody gains); the perfect foresight implies that a devaluation won’t occur immediately (i.e., that the rate after the attack will equal the pegged rate) because all agents can simply wait until their dollars have their preferred value and sell them at that point. But the consequence this buyout does have is that inflation increases: the Central Bank faces a massive sudden cut in domestic credit, because a lot of money is being put out of circulation to buy the dollars, entailing an immediate discrete jump in inflation (later work by the same authors explains what happens if the Central Bank prints money to counteract - spoiler alert, the same thing but with bonds).
Since the Macri Presidency started at the tail end of an unsustainable pegged rate (net reserves, i.e. the ones that can be sold, were negative because the Central Bank had more debts than assets), the devaluation he undertook (from 9 to 15 pesos) worked as explained here - with the caveat that since Argentinians do not, in fact, possess perfect foresight (oh, the trouble we would have avoided), then the exchange rate actually jumped and impacted inflation nonetheless - which the new authorities didn’t actually expect, dumbly, further demolishing perfect foresight.


As we can see, even the economically orthodox Macri administration wasn’t particularly good on orthodox theories of inflation. A combination of neglecting fiscal policy and not taking adequate precautions to prevent a currency run made their hard monetary policy useless at containing inflation sustainably, and once the currency run actually happened (mostly due to international factors + a drought) then investors stampeded out of the country out of mistrust in various occasions, resulting in both cost inflation, inertia (i.e. inflation impacting future contracts), and warped expectations. Inflation does have costs on output (one example) and on consumption, so this put the economy into a fragile and precarious situation, which led to a two-year long depression and to Macri himself losing his position, with few tears shed by long-suffering Argentinians.
Now, to the populist Fernández administration: he has massively tightened currency controls, excessively, and has doubled the monetary base, from 1 to 2 trillion pesos, over a three month period. The fact that there’s a lockdown is currently containing inflation: a combination of price controls on telecommunications, rent, and basic goods means most prices are frozen, and people are too focused on the day to day to demand anything that isn’t money. International reserves are at their lowest level in three years and agriculture, the golden goose of the trade surplus, has reduced sales by almost a fifth since export taxes make selling unprofitable at the current exchange rate. The fiscal deficit, meanwhile, has been engorged by emergency spending and is currently only being funded by seigniorage as the country is mired in a complex debt restructuring.
This scheme is obviously unsustainable in any term other than the shortest imaginable; the Central Bank, which has massively lowered interest rates (well into the negative double digit real rates) should raise them to a low, positive level to promote saving and to vacuum up that excess trillion that could go run on the currency at any time. The path to sustainability is threefold: a sensible fiscal framework that promotes credibility, consolidates a local debt market, and ensures an elimination of seigniorage (permanently and sustainably, not… Macrily); an independent, reasonable Central Bank that uses positive rates to promote saving while not deterring investment, and a competitive but stable exchange rate that maintains a balanced trade result to provide the economy with the foreign currency it demands while not burning out the Central Bank or inflation.
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The Argentinian Presidential Election, explained

What’s going on in Argentina?

Today, on October 27th, Argentina held its eight Presidential Election since 1983 (when the country left a 53 year period of political instability, violence, and coups) to elect a President, half the House of Deputies (allocated in proportion to each province’s population) and a third or the Senate (7 provinces and the City of Buenos Aires, the autonomous capital, elect 3 Senators each). Four provinces (Catamarca, the Province of Buenos Aires, La Rioja, and the City of Buenos Aires) are also electing their governors, with the Province of Buenos Aires being a must win territory for any government.
While Deputies are allocated proportionately, and Senators are divided between the two largest parties (2 for the winning ticket and 1 for the runner up), the Presidential vote is handled differently. The President is elected by a popular vote, where instead of requiring a 50% majority, a candidate must get 45% of the vote or 40% and a 10 point lead to the runner up in order to win; otherwise, a runoff election between the top two candidates must be held.
In August, the country held its Mandatory, Open and Simultaneous Primaries (PASO in Spanish), where all registered voters go to the polls and choose candidates for a variety of offices in both elected branches and in every jurisdiction; no party had unsettled candidacies for the majority of elections, though.
When the results came in, three hours later than expected, the whole country was in shock: while the polls had predicted President Mauricio Macri and his main rival, Alberto Fernández, to be virtually tied, Fernández won in a 16 point landslide and got enough votes to win without a runoff election (48,8% to Macri’s 32,1%).
The main reason Fernández won so decisively was the economy: Argentina has been in a severe recession since 2018, with dismal indicators: poverty reached 35%, inflation is projected to reach 57% and GDP to drop 3%, while the US dollar reached a record value of 64 pesos, compared to around 20 in April of 2018. I wrote a post here about the reasons for this severe crisis, so I won’t go into much detail about it.
I will detail who the Presidential candidates are, their platforms, and whether or not they have a real shot; also, I will mention some must watch provincial races; and finally, I will go into some detail about the challenges the next administration will face. Since there are 6 candidates, but only 3 have a real shot to win the election, I will focus on them over the rest.

Mauricio Macri: let’s change

Mauricio Macri is the 60 year old President of Argentina. He is the son of the late Franco Macri, a multimillonaire construction mogul, and had a privileged upbringing, attending a number of elite private schools. He became President of Boca Juniors soccer club, one of Argentina’s biggest teams, in 1995; in 2003, he decided to run for mayor of the City of Buenos Aires, and he was narrowly defeated. In 2007 he ran again, where he was elected with 60% of the vote in the runoff election. As mayor he served two terms, and mostly focused on infrastructure, administrative reform, and some investment in public services.
In 2015 Macri began a Presidential campaign, on a coalition known as Cambiemos, or “Let’s Change” in Spanish; besides his own party, Republican Proposal (known as Pro), he joined forces with Elisa “Lilita” Carrio’s Civic Coalition (a centrist, mostly conservative party which focuses on corruption, safety, and republican values), and the Radical Civic Union (UCR in Spanish, the country’s oldest political party with a centrist, liberal, social democratic ideology). He defeated the government’s candidate, Governor of Buenos Aires and former boat racer Daniel Scioli, 52 to 48% despite losing the first round of voting by three points, 34 to 37%.
His administration focused on three big issues: reforming the economy in a market-friendly manner (including opening the country to international trade and investment), impriving the quality of institutions and modernising bureaucracy, and big infrastructure projects.
Before his tenure started, the exchange rate with the dollar had been artificially frozen for a couple of years, while Central Bank reserves plunged; several price controls had been established (most notably on public utilities and transportation), and the country had not grown for two straight years since 2009.In his first year in office, he decided to deregulate the exchange market, create a pension plan for retirees who hadn’t contributed to Social Security, and slash subsidies for utilities, which massively increased prices and proved extremely unpopular with the majority of voters, despite them mostly benefitting the top 20%; he also had the country settle its debts with international creditors. Later, he reformed the pension system, with a new system to adjust pensions with regard to inflation; 2017 was the high point of his presidency, with poverty falling to a historic low of 25%.
One of Macri´s main goals was reducing the deficit: in 2015, it stood at almost 4% of GDP. Reforming the public sector and its role in the economy overall was key, and he slow-footed it during his entire term; this was a major mistake since the country’s anemic growth, high poverty, and other maladies stemmed (at least partially) from inflation, which was caused in the first place by long-term mismanagement of both fiscal and monetary policy.
There’s an ongoing debate amognst economists about the precise causes of the 2018 crisis: Macri’s first Central Bank President, Federico Sturzenegger, blames the big disconnect between monetary and fiscal policy: according to himself, he implemented a successful plan of inflation targeting whose credibility was demolished by the government not tackling the deficit (based on this lecture he gave at the Brookings Institution), who was later criticised by Harvard economist Rafael Di Tella for major design flaws in his own programs (Spanish language summary here). The other big issue of 2018 was a bill to legalise abortion: despite Macri himself being pro-life, he decided to allow Congress to debate the issue, unlike his more liberal predecessors. The bill ultimately died in the Senate after narrowly passing the House of Deputies, but it also energised the debate over abortion, sexual education, and feminism, which started after 2015’s Ni Una Menos (“Not One Fewer”) marches against violence against women and to bolster women’s rights.
Macri’s platform for 2019 is mostly a continuation of his current policies: he supports international trade deals, including the one currently being negotiated with the EU; inserting the country into the liberal international order in matters of foreign policy, structural reforms to the economy (including labor and tax reform), and defending democratic institutions against corruption and abuses of power. His chances of winning the election are incredibly slim, since his big loss to Alberto Fernández is nearly insurmountable; if he forces his way to a runoff, it’s hard to tell what could happen then.
Macri’s running mate is moderate Peronist Senator Miguel Angel Pichetto, the widely respected Minority Leader with deep political connections; he became an extremely controversial figure during the election, due to his incendiary comments comparing each and every one of his opponents to the Maduro regime and also calling them communists.

Alberto Fernández: get Argentina back on its feet

Alberto Fernández is a 60 law professor and former political operative running for President for a Peronist agglomeration known as Frente de Todos (“Everybody’s Front”). He served as President Néstor and Cristina Kirchner’s Chief of Staff from 2003 to 2008, when he left the position when Cristina had a major confrontation with food producers and rural workers. He became a major critic of Cristina Kirchner’s government for the past decade, during which he held no political office and became a Criminal Law professor.
Fernández has been a lifelong supporter of Peronism, an ideology founded by former President Juan Domingo Perón, which centers around a strong government, a well developed industrial sector, economic protectionism, state intervention in the economy, and non-alignment in foreign policy. Peronism has been the most influential ideology in Argentinian history, so a brief (-ish) history lesson is in order. Perón served as President from 1946 to 1955 and later from 1973 to his death the next year. His policies favoured workers and national industries, forging deep bonds with labour unions and some businessmen; his economics were a mixed bag, boosting equality and reducing poverty but ultimately leading to high inflation and scarcity of staple goods at the end of both his terms.
Peronists lost the 1983 election, the first held since Perón’s third wife and successor María Estela Martínez was deposed in 1983; President Alfonsín, of UCR, had to face structural problems in the economy, including a bout of hyperinflation at the end of his term that forced him to relinquish power earlier. His successor was Peronist Governor of La Rioja Carlos Saúl Menem, who campaigned as a populist promising higher wages and a productive revolution, but carried out some spending cuts, privatisations, and opened the country to trade and investments, plus a stable “1 to 1” peg to the US dollar. His reforms were limited and flawed, with massive corruption and numerous abuses of power (including packing the Supreme Court) happening under his watch. He was replaced by moderate UCR Mayor of Buenos Aires (the first directly elected, as decided in the 1994 Constitutional Reform) Fernando De La Rúa, who struggled to carry out unpopular reforms and was ousted by popular pressure after the economy collapsed in 2001. Since his vice President had resigned over corruption scandals, he was replaced with a series of acting Peronist Presidents, ultimately settling on Eduardo Duhalde, who devalued the currency and increased spending under Secretary of the Treasury Roberto Lavagna.
In 2003, Néstor Kirchner, a little known Governor of the southern Santa Cruz province, was elected President after Menem dropped out before the runoff; he espoused a more modern brand of Peronism (now known as Kirchnerism), which combined the old economic recipes with a higher regard of human rights and more emphasis on progressive social values. He served only one term, with Alberto Fernández serving as his Chief of Staff, and was replaced by his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (known to most Argentinians as just Cristina or by her initials, CFK). She continued her husband’s policies and expanded them, increasing welfare spending, and taxes; she had an infamous confrontation with the agricultural sector over export taxes, which led to Alberto's resignation. She had a somewhat authoirtarian attitude with regard to the courts: she tried to pack them with recess appointments and reforming the non partisan institution that picks judges so its members were all politicians, both of which were blocked by the Supreme Court. Her relationship with the media was also fraught: one of her political slogans was “Clarín lies”, directed at a newspaper critical of her. CFK and many of her closest associates have been accused of rampant corruption, with many of them being convicted and others, including herself, being indicted and/or awaiting trial in numerous charges.
Cristina Kirchner herself is Fernández’s running mate, which cleared the field of other potential candidates and helped unify the party; this handed him her considerable base, since the former President enjoys wide support from working-class Argentinians. They have mostly ran against Macri’s economy and have supported many progressive causes, especially abortion (and a vague stance on legalising marijuana). A big question for the markets, and most Argentinians, is what kind of President Alberto Fernández will be: will he take the populist, interventionist measures demanded by the party’s left wing, or will he stay on the market friendly course businesses and international institutions (notably the IMF, which gave Macri a 57 billion dollar loan last year)?.
Fernández has indicated he will renegotiate debts without defaulting (a proposal emanating from the far left), will boost small businesses and cut taxes on employers to boost employment, and will create new welfare programs to ease poverty and end hunger. These programs clash with his promises of balanced budgets and low inflation, which will be the major issue of a possible Fernández administration.
The biggest issue regarding Alberto himself is the deep uncertainty about his priorities and policies, leading to a panic after his landslide and a run on the peso, combined with a catastrophic plunge in the stock and bond markets.

Roberto Lavagna: I know how to do this

Roberto Lavagna is the 77 year old candidate for “Consenso Federal” (Federal Consensus), a moderate Peronist faction. He is an economist and served as Secretary of the Treasury under Eduardo Duhalde and Néstor Kirchner, a role in which he was widely praised as the mastermind behind Argentina’s recovery from the ruinous 2001 crisis. He ran for President in 2007, coming in third with 17% of the vote, and didn’t hold any office since. His running mate is another moderate Peronist, Governor of Salta Juan Manuel Urtubey, who is staunchly conservative and was something of an ally of Macri’s during his term.
Lavagna is running on a platform similar to Fernandez’s, emphasising his experience in the Cabinet; he includes new spending to boost job creation, more welfare, but he considers labor reform and some new trade deals fundamental to the next term (unlike Fernández). Lavagna doesn’t have much of a chance, only getting 7% of the vote in the primaries, but is the strongest contender besides the other two.

The rest of the pack: Del Caño, Espert, Gómez Centurión

The other 3 candidates are more ideological, filling in niches in the political spectrum and getting about 2% of the vote each.
First up is leftist Nicolás Del Caño, a 39 year old socialist activist who is running on a platform of progressive social policies (legalising abortion, legalising weed, soft on crime, etc.) and a far-left economic platform, mostly consisting on defaulting on the national debt and nationalising various sectors of the economy (energy, oil, pharmaceutics, healtchare, etc.). He’s popular with the youth, and has already run for President in 2015.
Then we have libertarian economist José Luis Espert, a 57 year old wirter and economics professor; his platform consists of massive efforts to deregulate and privatise the economy, with lower taxes and various pro-market reforms sprinkled in. His social policies are deeply problematic and inconsistent, since he claims to be pro-choice and supports sexual education, but on the other hand he’s espoused tough on crime policies and condemned the “human rights racket”. He also proposes ending welfare.
Finally, there’s 61 year old war veteran Juan José Gómez Centurión, a far right conservative running mostly on his pro life, deeply conservative values and economic policies similar to Espert’s.

Results and what comes next?

With 92% of votes counted, it seems Alberto Fernández will be our next President; he kept his 47% of the vote, but Macri surged 9 points and narrowed the gap to just 6%, getting 41% of the national vote. Macri also went from losing every province except his home City of Buenos Aires and Córdoba, to also beating Alberto in Santa Fe, Mendoza, Entre Ríos, and San Luis; his victory in Córdoba was an astounding 61% of the vote.
Alberto Fernández will have to grapple with the highly unstable economy left by Mauricio Macri, facing sky-high inflation (probably from 55 to 60%), poverty nearing 40%, a high debt burden of over 100% of GDP (which he will have to renegotiate), and a severe shortage of US reserves. It will be a big task, which requires a deeply pragmatic leader willing to make concessions, which Alberto has given no indication of being (and not being, because he’s an enigma). How much he can accomplish will be decided by the size of his victory: if he approaches 55%, there’s a high chance he takes a majority of both Houses of Congress, giving him ample wiggle room to push for his desired policy outcomes; any less will require compromise and negotiation with other parties, more likely than any Macri’s Juntos Por El Cambio (Together for Change).

Races to watch:

Besides from the pretty predictable Presidential election, there are two gubernatorial races worth keeping an eye on. The first one is the Buenos Aires Governor, where “macrista” incumbent María Eugenia Vidal was trounced in the primaries by 19 points by heterodox economist, former Treasury Secretary, and diehard Kirchner supporter Axel Kicillof. Kicillof is poised to win with a majority of the vote, giving Fernández a solid break, since almost 40% of the electorate lives on this province, and controlling it is a must for any successful administration; Vidal herself probably won because her 2015 opponent, Aníbal Fernández (no relation to either Alberto or Cristina) was a widely reviled hatchet man, with a penchant for aggressive gaffes and alleged ties to drug traffickers (he’s also nicknamed “The Walrus” for his hideous mustache). This result was mostly repeated, with Vidal gainign about 6% yet still losing by a healthy 15 point margin, boosting Fernández's ability to govern.
The other interesting race is the Mayor of Buenos Aires election (the mayor has the same rank as a governor, and the city has full representation in both Houses of Congress). Macri’s successor, Horacio Rodríguez Larreta, is widely liked and seen as competent, with big and ambitious infrastructure projects completed during his term. The party hasn’t lost power to Peronism in the city for the past 12 years, and Peronists only ever won the Presidential vote once, in 2015; in spite of this, Larreta is playing it safe, distancing himself from Macri and attempting to win a 50% majority and avoid a runoff. His main opponent is soccer club president Matías Lammens, a young and inexperienced politician with a progressive agenda. He is widely seen as less competent and not experienced enough, which massively hurt his chances after a series of gaffes and errors he made in the mayoral debates. Coming into the election, Larreta had the upper hand, after getting a majority in the primaries with a 17 point margin of victory; the problem is that, unusually, almost 9% of votes were blank, which might endanger his reelection bid. The election won't come to a runoff: Larreta beat Lammens by a 50 point margin, 55 to 35%.
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Weekly Update: Welcome HYDRO to ParJar, Parachute newsletter signup, MatchBX Gigs, Wysker Series and Continuous Wyskering... - 22 Mar - 28 Mar'19

Weekly Update: Welcome HYDRO to ParJar, Parachute newsletter signup, MatchBX Gigs, Wysker Series and Continuous Wyskering... - 22 Mar - 28 Mar'19
Good day everyone! Here’s another update for the whirlwind week we had at Parachute and Parachute/ParJar partners. IRL work keeps me from churning these out on time. Working on catching up quickly to try to post future weekly updates faster:

A cool new community started to interact with ParJar this week. HYDRO was added to ParJar and ParJar added to the Hydro group. Fantom did a shoutout and CoinPedia also tweeted about ParJar. Thank you guys! Which makes me think, if this shoutout of the shoutout to our original shoutout is shoutouted by Fantom again, would it be a shoutoutception? Hmm. Also, we had our quirkiest game in ParJar yet. Parachuters had to use this site to find the most bizarre item. Best ones would win some cool PAR. Haha! The top picks were from Patri cko, Cryptovan and Clinton.
New Wonders of the World circa 2019
There’s a new email signup link for folks new to Parachute. If you’re not receiving Cap’s emails, you can sign up there. Close to USD 600 has already been raised for the Charity Parena. Woot! To get in, make a small donation (min USD 5 or crypto equivalent directly and let Jason know or tip Clinton through ParJar) and get a chance to win a 1-of-a-kind shirt from the Parachute Shop! Plus, kiddie gear is now available in the Parachute Shop. All profits from the shop go to charity. Games Master Jason turned 34 this week. Belated Happy Birthday to ya Florida Man! We had uber fun with an accidental Cap discovery this week. Add your favorite number at the end of the following link to jump to any chat in the group. For example the following link takes you to the first ever message in Parachute. Awesome!
Three Good Bois are counting on you to sign up for the Parachute newsletter
The 2gether card was launched on 27th March for use across the Eurozone. The presale event is now listed on ICObench. Make sure to check out the BCT ANN. Admins on their TG are rewarding members with 2GB who make thoughtful posts there. 2gether has an opening for a Java Software Engineer. Have a look at their job listing and apply if you have what it takes! Spanish speakers are in for a treat this week: Cointelegraph discussed about the company in a write-up, founder Salvador’s article on the zero marginal cost concept was featured in a UNIR publication and CEO Ramon’s interview during a Madrid Stock Exchange visit also came out. The 2GT token will be issued as a Virtual Financial Asset (VFA) in Malta. Read more about it here.
2gether is the only one with a regulated token
Still figuring out how to deploy your trading algo to your Binance account? Here’s a detailed look on how to set up your API keys and deploying a strategy to live markets on Binance using the Cryzen Code Studio. Also, belated birthday wishes to Shuvro. Hope you had a great one! Folks who haven’t subscribed to the Cryzen YouTube yet, subscribe now. They now have a custom handle. Community member Jonny did a little Cryzen shoutout towards the end of his detailed Crypto Asset Prediction Series. This week’s Saturday Rock Wars at PurpleCoin was for the best guitarist of all time. Jimi Hendrix won the public vote by a whopping margin. BOMB token is looking for ambassadors who can bring “liquidity, awareness, and education to the project”. Learn more about it here. Checked out Wysker Series yet? These are listicles of bundled relevant content aimed at user growth. Design geeks will find it fascinating. Plus, the app will see a new feature soon called Continuous Wyskering. Jonathan says: “After finishing one story, users will no longer have to go back to the home screen to discover new stories. Instead, the next story in line can be accessed with a simple swipe.” Neat! And finally, Birdchain has partnered with Blocklads to bring educational content to the app's learn tab. Look out for new content in that section!
Shuvro’s ETC bot showing decent gainz
Gigs are now live on MatchBX. Freelancers can create listings for their services directly and job posters can directly hire freelancers from there. Win win! If you’re not sure of what MatchBX is, read up on it here. Plus, the weekly AXPR burn went on as scheduled. Bounty0x crossed 500k+ monthly page views this week with a ~30% return visitor rate. If you’ve participated in a Cures Token bounty on Bounty0x, this article is super relevant. Also, KABN partnered with Bounty0x this week for running promotional bounties for their token offering. The ETHOS token is now listed on the ChangeNOW exchange. Much has been said about the Voyager-ETHOS deal so far. Shingo explains in this article why the partnership will be “setting new standards of transparency”. District0x’s weekly update covers a range of topics including Brady’s interview with A Garden of Crypto on all things District0x.
AXPR tokenomics
Altcoin Buzz featured Opacity this week and talked about their current development roadmap which includes the 1.0 site launch (which was also this week). Check out for a look and feel of what’s in store for May. Badcredit wrote about Horizon State with a detailed piece. The Minister’s Recreational Fishing Advisory Council was announced this week as well. “The voting process has been transparent and historic - for the first time in South Australian Government history, Blockchain technology was used for the voting process." Big up to Horizon State for becoming a part of history! And finally, they closed off the week with a bang by getting listed on John McAfee talks about Switch around the 11 minute mark in this interview with Satoshi Sean. Blockport was the centrepiece of this Coinvision article that explains the ins and outs of both the exchange as well as the BPT/BPS tokens. The Blockport STO is set for April 15th with more details in this post. If you’re interested and live in the EU or the US, the whitelist procedure is explained here. And finally, onto some Fantom news. Coinspeaker elaborates what the myriad partnerships mean for Fantom in this article. Like last week, Fantom capped off this week too with another exchange listing – ChainX. Boom!

Thank you for taking the time. See you soon with another weekly update. Cheerio!
submitted by abhijoysarkar to ParachuteToken [link] [comments]

Texto de Rafael Narbona: "PODEMOS, EL PODER DE LOS CÍRCULOS" (parte 2)

Me he permitido esta digresión histórica para responder a un artículo de Miguel Urban titulado “Todo el poder a los Círculos (Pú, Blog Otras miradas, 09.0214), que evoca sin disimulo el conocido lema “Todo el poder para los soviets”. Es evidente que Urban –aunque no lo mencione explícitamente- invoca el centralismo democrático, cuando escribe: “es fundamental generar una nueva institucionalidad desde la base, en la que la gente se pueda empoderar mediante la participación política activa”. Sin embargo, matiza enseguida: “los círculos no son, claro está, las células de una organización revolucionaria. Deben ser, si acaso un modelo de ensayo-error para construir, desde abajo y colectivamente, una mayoría social dispuesta a encontrarse y caminar junta para hacer frente a un desafío mayúsculo: convertir a esa mayoría de expropiados en una mayoría política que cambie las reglas del juego”. Este objetivo –opina Urban- será irrealizable, sin renunciar a la tentación de transformar a la izquierda en una religión, con sus santos y capillas. “Los viejos tics de la izquierda” espantan a los votantes e impiden forjar una nueva mayoría. El 15-M marcó un nuevo rumbo y hay que seguir su estela: horizontalidad, participación ciudadana, desobediencia civil no violenta, un nuevo proceso constituyente. En ningún momento, Urban menciona las palabras socialismo, comunismo o anarquismo, pero se sobreentiende que esas tradiciones pertenecen a “los viejos tics de la izquierda” y no conviene agitar sus banderas. Urban tampoco menciona a los soviets, pero se apropia de su lema, sin reparar en su fracaso histórico como forma de poder popular y asambleario.
Pienso que no es posible gobernar un Estado-nación mediante asambleas. Tal vez la Ciudad Ideal de Platón, con un máximo de 25.000 habitantes, podría gobernarse de este modo, pero el tiempo de la polis pertenece a un pasado remoto y la utopía platónica jamás trascendió el papel. La actual concentración del poder en grandes corporaciones trasnacionales y la existencia de grandes bloques militares (el Bloque Atlántico, liderado por Estados Unidos, y el Bloque Asiático, con Rusia y China al frente) sugiere que las asambleas son formas de poder con escasas posibilidades de organizar una acción eficaz contra el sistema para cambiar sus reglas y establecer una verdadera soberanía popular. No es una iniciativa deleznable, pero no hay ejemplos históricos que acrediten su viabilidad. La Comuna de París gobernó durante 60 días, pero un ejército bien pertrechado y con una poderosa artillería barrió a los rebeldes. Los comuneros no eran simples ciudadanos, sino en muchos casos oficiales y soldados de la Guardia Nacional. Se luchó calle por calle, casa por casa. Los niños y las mujeres se involucraron en las escaramuzas. La represión fue terrible. Al menos, se fusiló a 20.000 rebeldes. La Comuna logró mantener los servicios básicos de la ciudad, pero fracasó al organizar su defensa. Cada barrio luchó por su cuenta, sin una estrategia común. Por el contrario, el ejército de Versalles lanzó su ofensiva bajo las órdenes de un mando central. Los barrios fueron cayendo uno tras otro, no sin ofrecer una heroica resistencia. No estamos en guerra, pero la derrota de la Comuna muestra la vulnerabilidad del poder asambleario. La URSS salió adelante gracias a las decisiones de Lenin, que subordinó los soviets a un Soviet Supremo, pese a que sus intenciones iniciales eran destruir al “parásito”, es decir, al Estado.
Se han dicho muchas cosas sobre el origen de Podemos. Algunos afirman que es una creación de Izquierda Anticapitalista, un Espacio Alternativo fundado en 1995 por militantes de la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria. La Izquierda Anticapitalista se declara revolucionaria, internacionalista, socialista y feminista. Se identifica con el marxismo, pero desde una perspectiva plural, abierta y crítica. En 2009, se inscribió en el registro de partidos políticos. No es una creación del 15-M, pero sintonizó con muchas de sus reivindicaciones. Otros sostienen que Podemos es una plataforma creada para forzar el relevo generacional en Izquierda Unida. De hecho, Pablo Iglesias Turrión mantiene unas excelentes relaciones con Alberto Garzón y ha manifestado públicamente que el joven diputado de IU debería encabezar la coalición. Por su parte, Garzón afirma que IU y Podemos convergerán en un futuro no muy lejano. Algunos entienden que ese encuentro significará la superación de la crisis interna provocada por la alianza con el PSOE en la Junta de Andalucía. Aunque las bases se manifestaron a favor de entrar en el Ejecutivo, la participación de IU en la política de recortes ha producido un hondo malestar y una notable pérdida de credibilidad. ¿Hasta qué punto coinciden IU y Podemos? Podemos pide la salida de la OTAN e Izquierda Unida manifiesta que debe crearse otro modelo de seguridad, que nos aleje del imperialismo norteamericano. Ni Podemos ni IU plantean salir del euro, pero sí refundar la Unión Europea para combatir la política neoliberal de la Troika. Por el contrario, el Frente Cívico de Julio Anguita sí se muestra partidario de salir del euro. El tema del euro no es una cuestión marginal, sino una pieza clave de la política actual y futura. Es difícil predecir lo que sucedería si España adoptara esta alternativa. Algunos profetizan un verdadero apocalipsis: fuga de capitales e inversiones, colapso del crédito, incremento de la deuda por la depreciación de la peseta o de la nueva moneda. Matthew Lynn, analista de la firma británica Strategy Economics, elaboró en 2012 un informe que auguraba un cuadro completamente distinto. España podría salir del euro sin grandes sufrimientos, pues posee “una balanza comercial favorable gracias a sus exportaciones y una industria productiva y estable”. Lynn afirma que España no debería buscar su futuro en el mercado europeo, sino en el latinoamericano. Desde esta posición, España podría imitar el ejemplo argentino, pues dispondría de una moneda propia y un banco nacional. Salir del euro sería como romper la paridad con el dólar. Gracias a esa arriesgada apuesta, Argentina pudo devaluar su moneda, aumentar el gasto público, adoptar políticas fiscales progresivas y redistributivas, y reducir su deuda externa de 62.500 millones a 35.300, obligando a sus acreedores a absorber la diferencia (un 42%). El PIB creció espectacularmente: un 90% en una década, con una tasa anual de un 8% y un 9%. El déficit del 5’6% en 2001 se convirtió en 2005 en un superávit del 1’9%. La pobreza se redujo un 30%, el desempleo bajó del 16% al 8% y la deuda pública pasó del 113% del PIB al 72%. Sin embargo, la reciente devaluación del peso argentino ha provocado una escalada inflacionaria, que sólo se ha contenido en el sector de los combustibles, gracias a la intervención estatal. ¿Se hundirá Argentina en una nueva crisis? ¿La reducción de la pobreza en Venezuela, Ecuador, Brasil o Bolivia se consolidará o sólo es un logro provisional? ¿Es posible otro modelo económico en un mundo caracterizado por la libertad de movimientos del capital, la independencia de los bancos centrales, las operaciones especulativas de las agencias de calificación y una casi ilimitada capacidad de maniobra de los fondos y entidades financieras?
Cuando Bill Clinton derogó la ley Glass-Steagall, se suprimió el mecanismo más estricto de regulación y vigilancia bancaria. Hasta entonces, los bancos de inversión no podían aceptar depósitos, gestionar cuentas de créditos y conceder préstamos, actividades reservadas a los bancos comerciales. Esa medida se aprobó al mismo tiempo que se relajaban las exigencias sobre las reservas y se permitía que las agencias off shore –que ocultan la identidad de los depositantes- florecieran a su antojo. El capitalismo de casino logró barra libre y su poder se hizo abrumador. Los beneficios de los bancos se dispararon con operaciones financieras que recurrían a los tecnicismos más intrincados para ocultar su naturaleza criminal y fraudulenta: mercados de futuros, carry trade, derivados, posiciones a corto. Mientras crecía la deuda pública y privada, los beneficios fluían hacia los paraísos fiscales. Se cree erróneamente que los paraísos fiscales sólo se hallan en islas exóticas, pero la realidad es que “están organizados y soportados por los Estados” (Vicenç Navarro). Por ejemplo, las leyes de Estados Unidos permiten a sus bancos aceptar dinero procedente de actividades delictivas, siempre y cuando los delitos se hayan producido en el exterior y no entre sus fronteras. El resto de los países no son más escrupulosos y, con el pretexto del secreto bancario, lavaron 238.000 millones de euros procedentes del narcotráfico entre 2007 y 2009. Cuando los bancos sufrieron graves pérdidas por culpa de la crisis, resolvieron sus problemas de liquidez con el dinero producido por el tráfico de drogas, armas o personas. Los rescates bancarios, que socializaron las pérdidas, aportaron el resto, condenando a millones de personas al paro, la pobreza y los desahucios. ¿Se puede luchar contra todo esto desde las instituciones? ¿Podemos y una Izquierda Unida renovada pretenden ser la versión española de la revolución bolivariana, rebelándose contra la Troika y el imperialismo norteamericano? ¿Es posible avanzar hacia el socialismo por vías pacíficas y exclusivamente democráticas? ¿Por qué escamotear una ideología que representa la única alternativa consistente al capitalismo? No hay una Tercera Vía, salvo que algún despistado haya olvidado las políticas de Tony Blair y Gerhard Schröder, desmontando el Estado del bienestar, con el pretexto de modernizar la socialdemocracia. Podemos nace con tres graves lastres. Primero: sus líderes son figuras mediáticas y su popularidad se asocia muchas veces a lo frívolo, lo previsible y lo prefabricado, particularmente cuando son excesivamente jóvenes. Tal vez no sea cierto, pero les costará mucho trabajo romper ese cliché y convencer de que no se trata de una opción personalista. Segundo: su miedo a emplear los símbolos y los discursos de la izquierda tradicional atrae a ciertos votantes, pero produce desconfianza en los que siempre se han identificado con el socialismo o el comunismo. No sé si merece la pena captar a esos votantes y sacrificar de entrada a los que nunca han perdido la conciencia social y política. Y tercero: hablan de crear alternativas al sistema de partidos, pero se presentan como fuerza política al Parlamento Europeo. El anarquismo –tal vez la forma más radical y sincera de insurgencia contra el capitalismo- jamás pactará con círculos que apuntan hacia un centro convencional. Es decir, hacia la constitución de un partido en un sistema diseñado por la economía de mercado. No sé si el modelo asambleario puede generar un poder popular capaz de subvertir el orden establecido. Me inclino a pensar que sólo es eficaz para objetivos puntuales. Pablo Iglesias Turrión elogia a los vecinos de Gamonal, pero los Círculos rechazan la etiqueta de “células revolucionarias”. Gamonal no ha surgido como una iniciativa revolucionaria, pero ha demostrado que las batallas se ganan en la calle, muchas veces de forma violenta, revolucionaria. Podemos no es el PSOE en vísperas de su victoria electoral, pero la sombra del desencanto ya le pisa los talones. Tendrá que resolver sus contradicciones y mostrar claramente sus cartas, si no quiere convertirse en una fuerza parlamentaria más, con escasas posibilidades de gobernar. El bipartidismo ha dibujado un círculo infernal. Para romper ese círculo será necesario más valentía, más transparencia y menos moderación.
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What is Margin  Margin Call Explained - YouTube ¿Qué es el Margin call? ¿Que es el Margin Trading? Qué es el margin call en forex (llamada de margen) y cómo ... ¿Qué es un Margin Call?

¡veamos qué es el margin call en Forex! Qué es el margin call en Forex. Un margin call es quizás una de las más grandes pesadillas que puedan tener los traders de Forex. Técnicamente, un nivel de margin call Forex al 100 % significa que cuando el nivel de margen de tu cuenta alcance el 100 %, aún puedes cerrar tus posiciones, pero no ... SI quieres aprender más sobre el Margin Call y ver de manera práctica diversos casos, así como métodos para prevenirlos, lo veremos en una sesión en DIRECTO en nuestra Sala de Trading el LUNES 1 de Octubre en la Sesión Formativa de 16:30-17:30. Para acceder, solo tiene que solicitar su acceso a través del siguiente banner. ¿Qué es un margin call?. Una llamada de margen, o margin call, es el requerimiento por parte del broker o dealer hacia el trader de añadir nuevos fondos para satisfacer el margen de mantenimiento necesario para cubrir sus posiciones en el mercado.. El margin call es una situación que se da en mercados en los que se opera con margen, es decir, en aquellos en los que se utiliza apalancamiento. El primer paso que se debe dar es conocer la terminología que se usa en este tipo de actividades, así evitar todo tipo de confusiones dentro del mercado.Y cuando se trata de operar, el margen y el margincall son dos de los términos que mayormente se deben tener presente. Sin importa el mercado en que se esté operando, estos términos funcionan de la misma manera. In this example, a margin call will be triggered when the account value falls below $7,142.86 (i.e. margin loan of $5,000 / (1 – 0.30), which equates to a stock price of $35.71 per share.

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What is Margin Margin Call Explained - YouTube

Jose Luis Herrera de CMC Markets nos explica en clave formativa qué es un Margin Call. ¿Conoces Rankia? ... All about margin and leverage in forex trading ... 23:38. Lo que NO Viste de MARGIN ... En este vídeo, veremos qué es el margin call o la llamada de margen en forex y recomedaciones para evitar el margin call. Podemos definir la llamada de marge... Subscribe: Learn more: Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube. Explains what happens when margin call event occurs, effect on your margin loan, profit and loss. How to avoid margin calls. Educational example provided. No...